UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 473, ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 00C 755 ) KANSAS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, ) Defendant. ) __________________________________)
On June 14, 2000, the Kansas State Board of Education (State Board) entered an Order transferring approximately 84.5 square miles of territory from Unified School District No. 473, Dickinson County, Kansas (Chapman) to Unified School District No. 435, Dickinson County, Kansas (Abilene). On June 27, 2000, Chapman filed a petition for review pursuant to the Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions, K.S.A. 77-601 et seq.
This court on July 26, 2000, denied Chapman's request for a stay and in the alternative for temporary injunctive relief. The parties thereafter agreed to file briefs on the legal issue and to submit the case on the agency record without additional evidence.
U.S.D. No. 435 ("Abilene") raises the issue of whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction in this case under the Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions (KJRA), K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. Abilene argues that the KJRA does not apply because the State Board is not a state agency as the term is defined in KJRA.
K.S.A. 77-603 provides:
(a) This act applies to all agencies and all proceedings for judicial review and civil enforcement of agency actions not specifically exempted by statute from the provisions of this act. (b) This act creates only procedural rights and imposes only procedural duties. They are in addition to those created and imposed by other statutes...
K.S.A. 77-602 defines "agency":
As used in this act: (a) "Agency" means a state agency... (k) "State agency" means any officer, department, bureau, division, board, authority, agency, commission or institution of this state which is authorized by law to administer, enforce or interpret any law of this state but does not include any political or taxing subdivision of the state, or any agency thereof, or the judicial or legislative branch of state government.
Abilene argues that the State Board is a political subdivision. Although Abilene cites no cases in which the State Board was found to be a political subdivision, Abilene does cite Wichita Public School Employees Union v. Smith, 194 Kan. 397 P.2d 357 (1964) in which the Kansas Supreme Court found that a school district is a political subdivision.
A school district is a political subdivision and its powers and authority to contract as to qualifications, tenure, compensation and working conditions of its employees are exercised by or through legislative fiat. Wichita Public Schools Employee Union at Syl. 1.
In addition, Abilene cites O'Hair v. U.S.D. No. 300, 15 Kan. App. 52, 805 P.2d 40 (1990) in which the Kansas Court of Appeals specifically found that KJRA does not apply to unified school districts since they are not state agencies.
Abilene apparently concludes that the State Board with its elected members is a political subdivision like the local unified school districts which it supervises.
However, in its own brief Abilene also refers to U.S.D. 443 v. Kansas State Board of Education, 266 Kan. 75, 966 P.2d 68 (1998) wherein the Kansas Supreme Court held that "(t)he district court should not have dismissed the state constitutional issue because the KJRA applies to actions of the State Board as a State agency not specifically exempted from KJRA. K.S.A. 77-603(a)." U.S.D. 443 at 91. While Abilene dismisses the Court's holding as not controlling since the Court did not consider the definitional section of the statute (K.S.A. 77-602(a) and (k)), the Kansas Supreme Court clearly referred to the "State Board as a State agency not specifically exempted from KJRA." Furthermore, the State Board clearly fits the description of a State agency as "any officer, department, bureau, division, board, authority, agency, commission or institution of this state which is authorized by law to administer, enforce, or interpret any law of this state..." (emphasis added).
Chapman cites State ex rel Schneider v. City of Kansas City, 228 Kan. 25, 612 P.2d 578 (1980) in which the Kansas Supreme Court found that the actions of the Board of Regents were of statewide concern rather than strictly local concern and therefore were not subject to Kansas City's building permit and building code ordinances. Since the State Board like the Board of Regents is a constitutionally created entity with statewide concern (ie. responsibility over the public schools), rather than local concern, this court finds that the State Board is a state agency and not a political or taxing subdivision of the state. Furthermore, the State Board is not specifically exempted under K.S.A. 77-603 and therefore KJRA applies to the actions of the State Board.
K.S.A. 77-621 sets forth the burden of proof and scope of review for a court to follow in reviewing an agency's action. The burden of proof is on the party asserting the invalidity of the agency action. K.S.A. 77-621(a)(1). Therefore in this case, the burden is on Chapman to prove the invalidity of the State Board's June 14, 2000 Order.
The standards and scope of review also are listed under K.S.A. 77-621(c). Chapman alleges in its brief that the following standards of judicial review are applicable to the State Board's June 14, 2000 action:
(1) The agency action, or the statute or rule and regulations on which the agency act is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied. K.S.A. 77-621(c)(1).
(2) The agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any provision of law. K.S.A. 77-621(c)(2).
(3) The agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or has failed to follow prescribed procedure. K.S.A. 77-621(c)(5).
(4) The agency action is based on a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the record as a whole, which includes the agency record for judicial review, supplemented by any additional evidence received by the court under this act. K.S.A. 77-621(c)(7).
(5) The agency action is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. K.S.A. 77-621(c)(8).
Although Chapman combined its argument on several of the standards, this court will address each of the standards that Chapman alleged were applicable in this case.
Chapman alleges that there are insufficient legislative guidelines circumscribing the nature, extent and the manner of exercise of the legislative function delegated to the State Board by K.S.A. 72-7108. This statute delegates to the State Board the authority to order land transfers between school districts. K.S.A. 72-7108 previously has been held to be a constitutional delegation of legislative authority. State ex rel. v. State Board of Education, 215 Kan. 551, 527 P.2d 952 (1974). In State ex rel., the Kansas Supreme Court held that there were "adequate guidelines to carry out the legislative function delegated ... in the school unification acts." State, ex rel. at 558. State, ex rel. refers specifically to three statutes contained in the school unification acts: K.S.A. 72-6734, K.S.A. 72-6744, and K.S.A. 72-8212 (formerly K.S.A. 72-6755). K.S.A. 72-6734 sets forth the general legislative intent and purpose for the school unification acts, K.S.A. 72-6744 (now repealed) set forth guidelines regarding expected enrollment and valuation of each district and K.S.A. 72-8212 sets forth grade and curriculum requirements. State, ex rel, however, did not intend the three statutes cited above to be an exhaustive list. "There are other statutory guidelines in the school unification acts and the foregoing are not intended to be exhaustive or to cover every situation." State, ex rel. at 558.
K.S.A. 72-6744 was repealed by the legislature in 1984 and no new legislative guidelines were enacted to replace it. The crux of Chapman's constitutional argument is that K.S.A. 72-6744 was the "pivotal key, controlling legislative guideline" and without it the school transfer statute, K.S.A. 72-7108, and the other school unification statutes are no longer sufficiently clear and definite to circumscribe the legislative function delegated. Chapman cites State, ex rel. Dix v. State Board of Education, 224 Kan. 38, 578 P.2d 692 (1978) as support for its argument.
In State, ex rel. Dix, supra the Kansas Supreme Court found that the State Board had transferred territory in contravention of the area and enrollment minimum guidelines contained in K.S.A. 72-6744. Chapman in its brief argues that even though the other school unification statutes still were the law at the time, they did not "save" the State Board. The State Board's action was enjoined and the transfer was not allowed. Chapman's argument, however, misses the mark. State ex rel., Dix does not establish K.S.A. 72-6744 as the key, pivotal, controlling legislative guideline. The Court in State, ex rel. Dix did find that the State Board's transfer order violated the minimum guidelines for area and pupils contained in K.S.A. 72-6744. Even more importantly, however, in this court's opinion, was the Court's reference to K.S.A. 72-6734 which requires in part the "general improvement of the public schools in the State of Kansas; [and] the equalization of the benefits and burdens of education throughout the various communities in the state..." The Kansas Supreme Court stated that uncontroverted evidence showed that U.S.D. No. 269 could not survive if the transfer was approved and that the transfer would seriously impair its ability to carry on its educational mission. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Commissioner of Education had admitted that the transfer would not result in an equalization of the benefits and burdens of education between the two districts. The equalization of benefits and burdens of education is contained in the legislative declarations and purpose of the School Unifications Acts. K.S.A. 72-6734.
Although the Court found that the State Board's transfer order violated the minimum guidelines on pupils and area, it is clear that the Court was concerned about the future viability of U.S.D. No. 269 and the failure of the State Board to consider the equalization of the benefits and the burdens of education between the two districts, a limitation still contained in the School Unification Acts. The Kansas Supreme Court in State ex rel. Dix noted that its prior opinion in State ex rel. had emphasized a clear limitation on the school transfer statute:
Uninhibited or successive transfers from one school district might well create a situation within such district which would seriously impair the ability of that district to carry on its educational mission. In such case disorganization might be the final result although not within the spirit of the school unification acts. Surely the authority delegated is not that broad. State, ex rel., 215 Kan. at 557.
Chapman cites and briefly discusses each of the school unification statutes and summarily dismisses each as not providing "any legislative guidelines for the State Board to follow in deciding land transfer cases," except for K.S.A. 72-6734. Even though the Kansas Supreme Court specifically references K.S.A. 72-8212 (a statute which contains grade and curriculum requirements that should be considered in making a territory transfer decision) and K.S.A. 72-7108 (the land transfer statute), Chapman claims that neither statute has any legislative guidelines for deciding land transfer cases.
While there were certain limitations contained in K.S.A. 72-6744, a statute which now has been repealed, as discussed below this court does not find that K.S.A. 72-6744 is such an essential statutory cornerstone without which K.S.A. 72-7108 collapses for lack of adequate legislative guidelines.
It is clear that a legislature may delegate the administrative power to administer or enforce a law to a different branch of government.
A delegated power constitutes administrative power if the delegation contains sufficient policies and standards to guide the nonlegislative body in exercising the delegated power. [citations omitted] In other words, the legislature may enact general provisions and delegate to an administrative body the discretion 'to fill in the details' if the legislature establishes 'reasonable and definite standards to govern the exercise of such authority.' [citations omitted]
State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov. of Wyandotte Co./Kansas City, 246 Kan. 293, 304, 955 P.2d 1136 (1998).
The modern trend is "to require less detailed standards and guidance to the administrative agencies in order to facilitate the administration of laws in areas of complex social and economic problems." Guardian Title Co. v. Bell, 248 Kan. 146, 154, 805 P.2d 33 (1991). See also State, ex rel. Tomasic, supra.
Certainly, land transfer decisions are based on a "complex area of the law involving social and economic issues." Land transfer issues are a subset of reorganization issues and therefore "should be harmonious with the purposes and provisions of the school unification acts and not be violative of the limitations prescribed by such laws." State, ex rel., 215 Kan. at 558.
Although K.S.A. 72-6744, which contained rather detailed and specific limitations, has been repealed, still remaining are other statutes which this court finds contain sufficient, reasonable and definite standards which govern the exercise of the delegated authority.
K.S.A. 72-6734 contains the legislative declaration and the broad purposes of the school unification acts, and any transfer order must be harmonious with the purpose as stated in K.S.A. 72-6734. As referenced above, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that "uninhibited or successive transfers from one school district might well create a situation within such district which would seriously impair the ability of the district to carry on its educational mission." State, ex rel., 215 Kan. at 557. The Court opined that a disorganization of a school district is not within the spirit of the school unification acts and that the authority delegated to the State Board is not that broad. State, ex rel. supra.
K.S.A. 72-7108, the land transfer statute, contains both the procedure to be followed in order to transfer land and the limitation that the territory to be transferred must be contiguous to other territory in the receiving district.
K.S.A. 72-8212 provides a clear legislative limitation on the delegated function in requiring that "every unified school district shall maintain, offer and teach Kindergarten and grades one through 12 and shall offer and teach at least 30 units of instruction for pupils enrolled in grades nine through 12 in each high school operated by the board of education..."
The Kansas Supreme Court in State, ex rel. also generally referenced other statutes within the school unification statutes, and while this court does not find any that are particularly pertinent in this case, they remain as part of the statutes which make up the School Unification Acts.
In conjunction with the Appellate Courts' modern trend towards requiring less detailed standards and guidance to administrative agencies in areas of complex social and economic problems, this court finds that the statutes listed above contain sufficient, reasonable and definite standards to govern the exercise of the delegated authority.
In addition, there is a well-established body of law relating to constitutional challenges of a statute.
The constitutionality of a statute is presumed and all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity. Before the statute may be struck down, it must clearly appear the statute violates the constitution. It is the court's duty to uphold the statute under attack if possible, rather than defeat it, and if there is any reasonable way to construe the statute as constitutionally valid, that should be done. State v. Huffman, 228 Kan. 186, Syl. ¶ 1, 612 P. 2d 630 (1980).
Guardian Title Co., 248 Kan. at 149.
Therefore, this court finds that Chapman's challenge under K.S.A. 77-621(c)(1) must fail as this court finds that neither the statute nor the application of the statute is unconstitutional.
Chapman raises the jurisdictional issue under Section C of its brief. Chapman first discusses the scenario that if there are not sufficient guidelines, then the State Board could have promulgated rules and regulations under K.S.A. 77-415 but failed to do so. However, much of Chapman's argument under Section C is moot because this court found that there were sufficient legislative guidelines. It is uncontroverted that the State Board did not adopt rules and regulations pursuant to K.S.A. 77-415. The failure to adopt rules and regulations governing the exercise of the power to transfer territory between unified school districts, however, was not fatal in State, ex rel. The Court found that there were adequate statutory guidelines to carry out the legislative function delegated in the school unification acts. State ex rel., 215 Kan. at 558.
Chapman argues in its brief that the June 14, 2000 Order is invalid because it goes beyond the legislative function delegated to it by K.S.A. 72-7108 since the State Board had no legislative guidelines nor rules nor regulations upon which to base its decision. This court disagrees as set forth above and finds that the State Board did not act beyond the jurisdiction conferred to it by law. This court previously found under the constitutional law section that there was no unlawful delegation of authority that violated the Separation of Powers Doctrine and Art. 2 § 1 of the Kansas Constitution.
Chapman alleges the State Board must render a written decision that is concise and contains a specific statement of relevant law and basic facts that support the decision. For authority, Chapman cites Farmland Industries, Inc. v. Kansas Corp. Commission, 25 Kan. App. 849, 852, 971 P.2d 1213 (1999). In response, the State Board contends that the requirement cited in Farmland is specific to the Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC) in that the KCC has adopted K.A.R. 82-1-232(3) which provides "(t)he order shall contain a concise and specific statement of the relevant law and basic facts which persuade the commission in arriving at its decision," and that such a requirement is not applicable to orders of the State Board.
However, Chapman correctly counters that the requirement is a basic requirement that is not only imposed by KCC's K.A.R. 82-1-232 but is also a requirement imposed by the Kansas Supreme Court to facilitate judicial review. Kansas Public Service Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 199 Kan. 736, 745, 433 P.2d 572 (1967). The Court quotes with approval Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal C. Com'n:
"...When a decision is accompanied by findings of fact, the reviewing court can decide whether the decision reached by the court or commission follows as a matter of law from the facts stated as its basis, and also whether the facts so stated have any substantial support in the evidence. In the absence of findings of fact the reviewing tribunal can determine neither of these things. The requirement of findings is thus far from a technicality. On the contrary, it is to insure against Star Chamber methods, to make certain that justice shall be administered according to facts and law. This is fully as important in respect to commissions as it is in respect to courts.
"In discussing the necessary content of findings of fact, it will be helpful to spell out the process which a commission properly follows in reaching a decision. The process necessarily includes at least four parts: (1) evidence must be taken and weighed, both as to its accuracy and credibility; (2) from attentive consideration of this evidence a determination of facts of a basic or underlying nature must be reached; (3) from these basic facts the ultimate facts, usually in the language of the statute, are to be inferred, or not, as the case may be; (4) from this finding the decision will follow by the application of the statutory criterion..." (p. 559.)
Kansas Public Service Co. at 745 (quoting Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal C. Com'n, 96 F. 2d 554, 559, Cert. den. 305 U.S. 613, 83 L. Ed. 391, 59, S. Ct. 72.
Certainly, the central issue in Kansas Public Service Co. was the failure of the administrative agency to make basic findings of fact which is not at issue here. Instead, the issue here as alleged by Chapman is the failure of the State Board to specifically state the criterion and standards used by the State Board in deciding the land transfer issue. It appears to this court that the failure of the State Board to cite all the School Unification Statutes that provide the limitations on its authority to authorize land transfers between two districts is harmless error. While inclusion of the statutory criteria would have been helpful to this court's Judicial Review of the State Board's June 14, 2000 Order, the omission is not fatal. K.S.A. 77-621 provides that the court in making the determinations regarding the invalidity of agency action shall follow the rule of harmless error.
The Kansas Supreme Court quotes a portion of the Saginaw opinion which spells out a four part process which includes:
"...(3) from these basic facts, the ultimate facts, usually stated in the language of the statute, are to be inferred or not, as the case may be:
(4) from this finding the decision will follow by the application of the statutory criterion..." (p. 559)
Kansas Public Service Co. at 745.
However, the Court cites Saginaw to underscore the necessity for findings of fact by administrative boards and commissions, not the failure of the agency to set out the statutory criteria.
The State Board transfer orders are not subject to the Kansas Administrative Procedures Act, K.S.A. 77-501 et seq. However, this court concurs with the State Board that its June 14, 2000 Order does conform to the requirements of K.S.A. 77-526(c). The Order contained separately stated findings of fact, conclusions of law and policy reasons for the decision.
The State Board in its Order made findings on disputed issues. The State Board, however, did not reference each of the applicable statutes in the School Unification Acts. K.S.A. 72-8212 (specifically referred to in State, ex rel at 558) requires that each school district shall maintain, offer and teach kindergarten and grades one through 12 and shall offer and teach at least 30 units of instruction for pupils enrolled in grades nine through 12. Both parties in questionnaires submitted to the State Board acknowledged that the proposed transfer would not impair the ability of the "giving" district to offer and teach 30 units of credit. ROA 0482; ROA 0719. Apparently there was no issue raised before the State Board regarding the transfer impacting Chapman's ability to comply with K.S.A. 72-8212.
Further, there have been no allegations by Chapman that the State Board violated the limitations set out by statute. Chapman does not even raise K.S.A. 77-621(4), ie. that the agency erroneously interpreted or applied the law. This court finds that the mere omission of the applicable statutes in the State Board's Order is harmless error.
Chapman also argues that the State Board failed to follow its own Guidelines for Land Transfers. However, the State Board has conceded that the Guidelines were not adopted as rules and regulations and therefore don't have the force and effect of law. This court ruled previously that the Guidelines are a nullity and, therefore, whether or not the State Board followed its own guidelines is legally inconsequential. Memorandum Decision and Order dated July 16, 2000, p. 7.
"If the agency action is constitutionally authorized by statute, it is presumed valid on review unless it is not supported by substantial competent evidence and is so wide of its mark as to be outside the realm of fair debate, or is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious and prejudices the parties." Vakas v. Kansas Board of Healing Arts, 248 Kan. 589, Syl. ¶ 5, 808 P.2d 1355 (1991).
Chapman in its briefs does not allege any fact that is not supported by the evidence in the agency record. This court, therefore, finds that Chapman has not met its burden to show that there is not substantial evidence to support the agency's findings of fact upon which the agency's action was based.
Finally, Chapman argues that the State Board's action was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. Chapman alleges that the State Board's Order is "silent" regarding the legal standards upon which it based its order and the silence suggests that there were no legislative standards used which makes the action unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. Chapman points out that the only "legal" basis referenced in the Order was the State Board's "internal" Guidelines for Land Transfers which were as stated above a nullity. Even so, Chapman argues that the State Board didn't comply with its own policies which again renders the Order unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious.
"The arbitrary and capricious test relates to whether a particular action should have been taken or is justified, such as the reasonableness of an agency's exercise of discretion in reaching a determination or whether the agency's action is without foundation in fact." Pork Motel, Corp. v. Kansas Dept. of Health and Environment, 234 Kan. 374, 381, 673 P.2d 1126 (1983).
The legislature delegated to the State Board the authority to decide territory transfers as long as there were no violations of the limitations set forth under the statutes. State ex rel., 215 Kan. 551. The parties do not dispute that the transfer of territory from one district to another is a legislative function delegated to the State Board pursuant to K.S.A. 72-7108.
It seems to this court that legislative functions by their very nature are different from judicial or quasi-judicial functions. If the delegated authority is constitutional and applied constitutionally, the act is presumed valid unless not supported by substantial evidence or is otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.
This legislative function delegated by the legislature to the State Board is the authority to make policy decisions regarding transfer of territory. This delegation of policy decisions conveys to the State Board a certain amount of discretion limited only by the school transfer statute, K.S.A. 77-7108, and the statutes within the School Unification Acts, K.S.A. 72-6734 et seq.
A legislative function is different from a judicial or quasi-judicial function in which an agency must make specific findings pursuant to statutory criteria regarding its actions. The legislature certainly is not required to make findings regarding each proposed statute prior to enacting it into law. The Kansas Administrative Procedures Act recognizes the difference in the type of decisions that an agency makes in K.S.A. 77-526(c) when it refers to "policy reasons for the decision if it is an exercise of the state agency's discretion." Certainly, the State Board did include policy reasons for its decision. This court does not find that the failure of the State Board to set out the legal standards upon which it based its decision makes the State Board's action arbitrary or capricious.
"Unreasonable action" is action taken without regard to the benefit or harm of all interested parties. Zinke and Trumbo, Ltd. v. KCC, 242 Kan. 470, 474-475, 749 P.2d 21 (1988).
Chapman argues that the June 14, 2000 Order is silent regarding the long-term effect the transfer would have on the Talmadge area, the Abilene school district, the Chapman school district and their students.
The State Board counters that the Board's Order specifically recites the State Board's expectation that the transfer will promote the ties between school and community due to the Talmadge area's closer geographic proximity to Abilene. The findings and conclusions in the June 14, 2000 Order are certainly sufficient with regard to the benefit to the Talmadge area and its students, but the Order fails to include any findings regarding the impact of the transfer on the Chapman district and its remaining students and the Abilene district and its students.
One of the purposes of the School Unification Acts as stated in K.S.A. 72-6734 is "the equalization of the benefits and burdens of education throughout the various communities in the state." In State ex rel., 215 Kan. at 557, the Court set out a clear limitation on transferring territory from one district to another.
Uninhibited or successive transfers from one school district might well create a situation within such district which would seriously impair the ability of the district to carry on its educational mission. In such case disorganization might be the final result although not within the spirit of the school unification acts. Surely the authority delegated is not that broad.
State, ex rel., 215 Kan. at 557.
In State ex rel. Dix, 224 Kan. 38, the Court found that there was uncontroverted evidence that showed that U.S.D. No. 269 ("the giving district") could not survive if the transfer were approved. Here, certainly there is not even an allegation found in the record or in the briefs that Chapman will not survive if the transfer is allowed. However, in the June 14, 2000 Order, there is no finding regarding the effect on the benefits and the burdens to both districts.
The question, therefore, is whether the omission in the June 14, 2000 Order of specific findings regarding the equalization of the benefits and burdens between the two districts involved makes the action of the State Board unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. In its briefs, Chapman does not assert any inequality in benefits and burden that would result if the transfer was approved. Certainly, Chapman has argued the loss of state aid and assessed valuation, but those losses are ones that would be incurred by the "giving" district in any territory transfer.
This court, while concerned that there is no specific reference to equalization of the benefits and burdens of education between the districts and the impact on all students affected by the transfer, does not find that the action of the State Board was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. The silence by the State Board in failing to specifically reference each limitation contained in the School Unification Acts is harmless error when there is no allegation that any of the limitations have been violated. The burden is on Chapman to prove the invalidity of the State Board's June 14, 2000 Order.
For the reasons set out above this court, therefore, finds that the State Board's June 14, 2000 Order is valid. The above constitutes the court's findings and rulings regarding its judicial review of the agency action, and no further journal entry is required.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 6th day of February, 2001.
____________
Nancy Parrish
Judge, Third Judicial District
Division Fourteen
I hereby certify that a copy of the above and foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER was mailed this 6th day of February , 2001, to the following:
Vic Jacobson
Jacobson & Jacobson
526 West Sixth Street
P.O. Box 1167
Junction City, Kansas 66441-1167
Dan Biles
10990 Quivira, Suite 200
Overland Park, Kansas 66210
Rodney J. Bieker
Kansas Department of Education
120 East 10th Street
Topeka, Kansas 66612-1103
Debra E. James
Hampton & Royce
119 West Iron Street
P.O. Box 1247
Salina, Kansas 67402-1247
_______________
Norma J. Dunnaway
Administrative Assistant