IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SHAWNEE COUNTY, KANSAS
DIVISION TWELVE
LORI CHAPMAN et al.,
Petitioners,
v. Case No. 05-C-1122
THE KANSAS GOVERNMENTAL
ETHICS COMMISSION,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes before the Court on the Petition for Judicial Review filed by the Petitioners pursuant to the Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Action, K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. on August 31, 2005. The Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission filed its Response to the Petition for Judicial Review on October 3, 2005. No Reply Brief was filed by the Petitioners. Thus, since the issues have been fully briefed by the parties and there has been no request for oral argument, this matter is now deemed to be submitted to the Court for ruling.
NATURE OF ACTION
The Petitioners seek judicial review of the “Findings of Fact and Report” issued by the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission on June 3, 2005. Although the “Findings of Fact and Report” did not state the applicable burden of proof, the Commission concluded that the Petitioners had violated K.S.A. 46-237a(c). The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute and several of the material facts were stipulated to by the parties on the record pursuant to the provisions of K.A.R. 19-7-4(g). Thus, the issue presented in this action for Judicial Review is whether, based on these undisputed facts, the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission appropriately found by “clear and convincing evidence” that the Petitioners “intentionally violated” the provisions of K.S.A. 46-237a(c).
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Petitioners are non-managerial employees of the State of Kansas with more than 170 years of combined public service. (Transcript of Hearing, p. 14, lines 9 to 12.) It is uncontroverted that their employer, the Kansas Department of Education, directed the Petitioners to evaluate the service, food and accommodations of two area hotels as possible sites for future educational conferences and meetings conducted by the State of Kansas. (Id. at p.7, lines 14 to 22.) The purpose of the evaluations was an attempt to “save the State money and streamline the process” in scheduling educational meetings and conferences. (Id. at p. 19, line 21 to p. 20, line 3.)
The arrangements for the hotel evaluations were made by Ronald K. Nitcher, the Director of Fiscal Services and Operations for Kansas Department of Education. (Id. at p. 19, lines 1 to 5.) Dale M. Dennis, the Deputy Commissioner of Education, also helped with some of the arrangements for the evaluations. (Id. at p. 106, 13 to 17.) It should be noted that no Complaints were filed with the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission against either Mr. Nitcher or Mr. Dennis arising out of their involvement in making the arrangements for the hotel evaluations in question and they are not parties to this case. (See Agency Record.) [Nothing in this decision should be construed to mean that the Court believes either of them intentionally violated Kansas law.] Nevertheless, the record clearly reflects that none of the Petitioners participated in making the arrangements for the hotel evaluations. (Transcript, p. 39, lines 4 to 10 and p. 107, lines 13 to 16.)
The Petitioners were informed in an e-mail from Director Nitcher that the Kansas Department of Education had arranged for them to evaluate the Ramada Inn over their lunch hours on November 22, 2004, and to evaluate the Holidome over their lunch hours on November 23, 2004. (Id. at p. 25, lines 8 to 17.) The record reflects that two e-mails were sent by Mr. Nitcher to the Petitioners regarding the hotel evaluations. (Exhibits 1 and 3.) In the second of the two e-mails regarding the arrangements which had been made for the evaluations, the Petitioners were told that “both hotels plan to provide an ‘informal’ lunch for you while you tour the facilities.” (Transcript, p. 8, lines 1 to 3.) However, there was no mention of the arrangements, if any, which had been made by the Kansas Department of Education regarding payment for the lunches. (Transcript, p. 38, lines 14 to 16.)
The Petitioners followed the instructions provided by their superiors at the Kansas Department of Education and participated in the hotel evaluations. (Id. at p. 109, lines 8 to 12.) Moreover, the parties have stipulated that all of the Petitioners except Lori Chapman ate lunch during the Holidome evaluation and that all of the Petitioners except Theresa Cote ate lunch during the Ramada Inn evaluation. (Id. at p. 96, lines 7 to 18.) Furthermore, the parties have stipulated that none of the Petitioners were aware of who was paying for the lunches in question. (Id. at p. 102, lines 12 to 25.) However, the record reflects that the lunches were ultimately paid for by the Kansas Department of Education in February of 2005, which was prior to the filing of the Complaints in this case. (Id. at p. 31, lines 4 to 24.)
An Investigator for the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission filed Complaints against the Petitioners on or about March 2, 2005. (See Governmental Ethics Commission Complaint Nos. 364 to 378.) The Complaints were signed by William D. Beightel. (Id. and Transcript at p. 46, lines 13 to 25.) In the Complaints, Mr. Beightel alleged that the Petitioners had “accepted a free meal from a source outside of state government . . . in violation of K.S.A. 46-237a(c).” (See Complaint Nos. 364 to 378.) Mr. Beightel did not allege in the Complaints that the actions of the Petitioners were intentional. (Id.) Moreover, Mr. Beightel admitted at the Commission hearing held on May 23, 2005, that he had “no evidence that [the Petitioners] intended to violate the statute.” (Transcript at p. 67, lines 19 to 25.)
At the Commission hearing, Ronald K. Nitcher testified regarding the arrangements that he and Mr. Dennis had made for the Petitioners to evaluate the Ramada Inn and Holidome. (Id. at pp. 18 to 45 and 74 to 86.) In his capacity as Director of Fiscal Services and Operations, Mr. Nitcher testified that he was concerned about controlling the expenses associated with the meetings and conferences conducted by the Kansas Department of Education. (Id. at p. 37, lines 11 to 14.) He further testified that his communications with the Petitioners regarding the arrangements which the Kansas Department of Education had made for the hotel evaluations were contained in the written e-mails. (Id. at p. 19, lines 8 to 20; and, Exhibits 1 and 3.) Mr. Nitcher also testified that there was nothing in the e-mails to suggest that the lunches were being provided free by the hotels. (Id. at p. 35, line 22 to p. 36, line 2.)
Furthermore, Mr. Nitcher testified that the hotel evaluations arranged by the Kansas Department of Education specifically included an evaluation of the food service. (Id. at p. 37, lines 20 to 23.) In addition, he testified that food quality is an important part of the conferences and meetings conducted by the Kansas Department of Education and that the Department relied on the Petitioners’ opinions, comments and evaluation of the two hotels. (Id. at p. 39, line 19 to p. 40, line 1.) However, the Petitioners had no authority to enter into a contract with the hotels or to make decisions on behalf of the Kansas Department of Education. (Id. at p. 37, lines 15 to 19.)
Mr. Nitcher testified that the lunches served during the evaluations “gave our folks the opportunity to sample the quality of the food to see if it would meet our needs and if it was served . . . in a professional manner. (Id. at p. 30, lines 19 to 23.) He further testified that the lunches were served to the Petitioners as part of the evaluation process. (Id. at p. 30, line 24 to p.31, line 3.) Mr Nitcher admitted that there was no discussion with the Petitioners regarding payment for the lunches but that the Kansas Department of Education “just simply asked them to go.” (Id. at p. 38, lines 14 to 16.) Although the hotel evaluations were conducted as official business on behalf of the State of Kansas and were held over the Petitioners’ lunch hours, Mr. Nitcher does not believe that they were compensated for their time. (Id. at p. 79, line 21 to p. 80, line 12.) Moreover, he testified that at the time he made the arrangements for the hotel evaluations, “We honestly didn’t know what type of food was going to be served [or] how it was going to be delivered . . .that’s why I used the word informal” in his e-mail to the Petitioners. (Id. at p. 43 , lines 1 to 5.)
In testifying regarding the language which he used in the e-mails to the Petitioners, Mr. Nitcher candidly admitted that “my educational background is in accounting and not English or literature and so I probably could have done a better job to -- relay that information” regarding the lunches which were going to be served. (Id. at p. 29, lines 21 to 25.) However, Mr. Nitcher testified that he never informed the Petitioners that they would need to pay for the lunches to be served during the hotel evaluations. (Id. at p. 43, lines 18 to 20.)
At the conclusion of the hearing held on May 23, 2005, the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission went into Executive Session and the Court is not privy to the discussion which occurred. (Id. at p. 120, line 17 to p. 121, line 24.) Upon returning to the hearing, Commissioner Dale Pike moved that the Petitioners in this case be found to have “violated 46-237a and I believe (c) in each of the instances in which they are charged in their complaint, that they did violate the statute . . . and the Commission’s attorney has proved by clear and convincing evidence those violations. (Id. at p. 122, lines 14 to 21.) Commissioner Pike further moved that the Petitioners be fined a penalty of “$1 per violation.” (Id. at p. 123, lines 3 to 4.)
After the motion was seconded, Commissioner John Solbach stated that “I don’t believe that the burden of clear and convincing evidence has been met, and I do believe, given the legislative history of this statute, that . . . the action or conduct is not intentionally violative of the provision of this act.” (Id. at p. 123, lines 18 to 25.) However, Commissioner Solbach further stated that he would support the motion since it was “sending a message” while at the same time showing “the appropriate mercy by only imposing a $1 fine when a $5,000 fine could be imposed in each of these cases and a $10,000 fine could be imposed in most of these cases.” (Id. at p. 124, line 22 to p. 125, line 2.) Subsequently, the motion was passed and the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission issued its “Findings of Fact and Report” on June 3, 2005. (Agency Record.) An “Order Denying Rehearing” was entered by the Commission on August 2, 2005. (Id.) ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Standard of Review.
As indicated above, this action is brought by the Petitioners pursuant to the Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions, K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. The Act establishes the exclusive procedure for judicial review of administrative actions in Kansas. (K.S.A. 77-606.) The Court’s review of issues of law is unlimited. See Hamilton v. State Farm & Cas. Co., 263 Kan. 875, 879, 953 P.2d 1027 (1998). However, the Court’s review of questions of fact are limited to the record. (K.S.A. 77-618.) In reviewing the evidence, the Court must do so in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. See Lacy v. Kan. Dental Bd., 274 Kan. 1031, 1037, 58 P.3d 668 (2002). In this action for Judicial Review, the burden of proving the invalidity of the Commission’s decision is on the Petitioners. (K.S.A. 77-621(a).)
The Court may grant the relief requested by the Petitioners under the following circumstances: 1) the action taken by the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission was unconstitutional; 2) the Commission acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by law; 3) an issue requiring resolution by the Commission was not decided; 4) the Commission interpreted or applied the law erroneously; 5) the Commission members followed unlawful procedures or failed to follow the prescribed procedures; 6) the Commission was improperly constituted; 7) the Commission’s findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the record as a whole; and/or, 8) the Commission’s action was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. (K.S.A. 77-621(b).) In performing a judicial review, the Court must also consider the harmless error rule. (K.S.A. 77-621(c).)
B. Contentions of the Petitioners.
In this case, the Petitioners contend that the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission’s “decision constituted an erroneous interpretation of the law and was otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, in that specific violative intent is statutorily required and it was in fact stipulated that petitioners were neither aware they were violating the statute nor aware of the source of funding for the meals” which were provided as they evaluated the service, food and accommodations of two area hotels at the direction of their employer on November 22 and 23, 2004. Specifically, the Petitioners contend that they lacked any information regarding whether their employer, the Kansas Department of Education, or any other person or entity paid for the lunches served during the hotel evaluations.
C. Contentions of the Respondent.
The Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission contends that the “findings and decisions of the Respondent in this case were supported by substantial competent evidence.” Specifically, the Commission argues that since the Petitioners “were aware that they were accepting meals provided to them by the hotels, and that they were not paying for those meals,” they intentionally violated the provisions of K.S. A. 46-237a(c). Moreover, the Respondent contends that no specific intent to violate the statute was required.
D. Application of K.S.A. 46-237a(c) and K.S.A. 46-277.
This case is controlled by K.S.A. 46-237a(c) and K.S.A. 46-277. Interpretation of statutes is a question of law to be decided by the Court. See Citizens’ Util. Ratepayer Bd. v. State Corp. Comm., 264 Kan. 363, 410, 956 P.2d 685 (1998). However, an agency’s “interpretation of a statute that it is charged to interpret and enforce, using its expertise, is entitled to a great deal of judicial deference by the courts. “ Id. (quoting City of Wichita v. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., 259, Kan. 628, 631, 913 P.2d 137 (1996).) The burden of proof on appeal is on the party challenging an agency’s statutory interpretation. Nat’l. Council on Comp. Ins.. v. Todd, 258 Kan. 535, 905 P.3d 114 (1995). “Yet, an agency’s interpretation is not binding. If an agency is mistaken as to a question of law, the court has an obligation to cure the agency’s action.” Id. at 539.
K.S.A. 46-237a(c) provides, in part, as follows:
“No person subject to the provisions of this section shall
solicit or accept free . . . meals from a source outside of
state government . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
K.S.A. 46-277 provides as follows:
“No act, action or conduct of any person shall constitute
a violation of this act . . . unless such act, action or conduct
is intentionally violative of a provision of this act . . . .”
(Emphasis added.)
In this case, the “Findings of Fact and Report” issued on June 3, 2005, fails to state the burden of proof which was applied by the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission. However, it is clear that K.A.R. 19-7-4(j) requires the decisions of the Commission to be based on a “clear and convincing evidence” standard. Thus, the Commission had the burden at the hearing held on May 23, 2005, to establish that the Petitioners “intentionally” violated K.S.A. 46-237a(c) by knowingly accepting a “free” meal which was paid for by a source other than the State of Kansas.
As the Kansas Court of Appeals has held, the obligation to prove an intentional act by “clear and convincing evidence” places a “heavy burden of proof” on the party asserting the wrongdoing. Graggy v. Rhoney, 20 Kan. App. 2d 123, 128, 884 P.2d 443 (1994). See Modern Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Cinderella Homes, Inc., 226 Kan. 70, 78, 596 P.2d 816 (1979); and, Fox v. Wilson, 211 Kan. 563, Syl.2, 507 P.2d 252 (1973). Moreover, the Official Comment to P.I.K.3d (Civil) 102.11, citing Winston v. Burnell, 44 Kan. 367, 24 P. 477 (1890), refers to the “clear and convincing evidence” standard as “ [a] higher and more satisfactory character of proof” than a pure preponderance of the evidence standard. Moreover, P.I.K.3d (Civil) 102.1.1 defines “clear and convincing evidence” to be that “which is ‛clear’ in the sense that it is certain, plain to understand, unambiguous, and ‛convincing’ in the sense that it is so reasonable and persuasive as to cause you to believe it.”
A review of the legislative history of K.S.A. 46-277 reveals that the statute “was intended to handle intentional violations and not the accidental violations.” (Minutes of the Senate Committee on Judiciary, Report of Senator Robert Bennett on S.B. 689, February 5, 1974.) For the definition of the term “intentional,” the Commission relies on the case of State ex rel. Murray v. Palmgren, 231 Kan. 524, Syl. 10, 646 P.2d 1091 (1982). In Palmgren, the Kansas Supreme Court held that “intentional” violations of the law are ones in which persons “purposefully do the acts denounced” by the statute in question. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the term “intentional” is defined in P.I.K.3d (Criminal) 54.01-A as “willful and purposeful and not accidental.” (Emphasis added.) In turn, the term “willful” is defined in P.I.K.3d (Civil) as “An act performed with a designed purpose or intent on the part of the person to do wrong . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
In the present case, the record does not contain substantial evidence of a willful, purposeful, designed or intentional violation of K.S.A. 46-237a(c) by the Petitioners. Moreover, the limited evidence regarding intent in the record is far from “clear,” “certain” or “unambiguous.” Rather, Commissioner Solbach was correct when he stated on the record: “I don’t believe that the burden of clear and convincing evidence has been met and I do believe, given the legislative history of this statute. . . .the action or conduct is not intentionally violative of the provisions of this act.” Moreover, Commissioner Solbach’s comments regarding the Commission’s desire to send a “message” while, at the same time, attempt to show “mercy” to the Petitioners is evidence of a compromise based on equity rather than a decision based on law.
Certainly, this Court does not wish to be unduly critical of the Commission’s decision in this case. The Court understands why the Commission members would attempt to find an equitable solution which they sincerely believed to be just under the unique set of facts with which they were faced. However, there still must be “clear and convincing” evidence in the record of an intentional violation of K.S.A. 46-237a(c) before the Court can affirm the Commission’s decision.
It is important to recognize that a violation of K.S.A. 46-237a(c) can result in a civil penalty of up to $5,000.00 for the first violation and $10,000 for a second violation. Moreover, a violation of this statute may also be used to subject an employee of the State of Kansas “to discipline up to and including termination.” In addition, a violation of K.S.A. 46-237a(c) may constitute “a class B misdemeanor” pursuant to K.S.A. 46-276 for which the penalty is up to six(6) months in jail. Thus, it is understandable why the Kansas Legislature did not intend for accidental transgressions by state employees to constitute violations of K.S.A. 46-237a(c) and it is understandable why the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission is required to meet the “heavy burden of proof” of establishing intentional violations of the statute by clear and convincing evidence.
It is undisputed from a review of the record in its entirety that the Petitioners were specifically instructed by their employer to evaluate the service, food and accommodations of the two hotels in question. There is no allegation that the Petitioners solicited the hotels for “free” lunches or that they had any knowledge of who was paying for the lunches served during the hotel evaluations. Moreover, since the record reflects that both of these hotels are owned by the same person or entity (Transcript at p. 103, lines 21 to 24) and that the Petitioners had no contractual authority to enter into an agreement with the hotels regarding conferences and meetings conducted by the Kansas Department of Education (Id. at p. 37, lines 15 to 20), there is no reason to believe that the Petitioners intended to do wrong when they ate the lunches which were provided nor is there evidence that the hotels were in competition with one another for business.
The uncontroverted evidence reveals that it was Ron Nitcher, the Director of Fiscal Services and Operations of the Kansas Department of Education, who selected the hotels to be evaluated, who made the arrangements for the hotel evaluations, who instructed the Petitioners to participate in the hotel evaluations and who advised the Petitioners that lunch would be served during the evaluations. In addition, the record clearly reflects that the quality and pricing of food was one of the specific areas which the Petitioners were instructed to evaluate on behalf of their employer. Moreover, it is clear from the record that the evaluations and tours were specifically intended to benefit the Kansas Department of Education for the purpose of planning for future meetings and conferences.
Although Mr. Nitcher stated in his e-mails to the Petitioners that both hotels planned to provide “an ‛informal’ lunch” during the evaluations, he did not define the term “informal” nor did he state the terms of the “arrangements” which the Kansas Department of Education had made to pay for the lunches. Likewise, he did not tell the Petitioners that they should pay for their own lunches. Certainly, the Petitioners would have had a right to assume that their employer would obey Kansas law (including the provisions of K.S.A. 46-237a(c)) when it made the arrangements for a lunch to be provided during the hotel evaluations. See Jensen v. Sierra Petroleum, 189 Kan. 472, 474, 370 P.2d 425 (1962).
Interpretation of written documents is a question of law. See Northern Assurance Co. v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 249 Kan. 662, 665, 822 P. 2d 694 (1993). In interpreting the e-mails sent by Mr. Nitcher, it is appropriate to use the common definitions of the words used. For example, the term “arrangements” is defined as “a disposition or preparation for a future event . . . something planned or agreed; a settlement or agreement between parties.” (Emphasis added.) Oxford English Dictionary (1997). Similarly, the term “arrange” means to “plan or settle beforehand the details of (something to be done); give instructions for, cause to take place.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Thus, it was reasonable for the Petitioners to assume that their employer had reached an agreement with the hotels in advance regarding the details of the hotel evaluations -- including the lunches to be served.
Moreover, the term “lunch” is defined as “ a meal taken around midday or early afternoon, spec. one lighter or less formal than the evening meal.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Likewise, the term “informal” is defined as “without formality or ceremony, unceremonious.” (Emphasis added.) Id. On the other hand, the term “formal” is defined as “rigorously observant of etiquette, convention, etc.; prim; (unduly) precious or ceremonious.” (Emphasis added.) Id. The record in this case does not reveal evidence that the Petitioners were served a meal with formality or ceremony. Rather, they simply ate the lunches placed in front of them as they conducted the hotel evaluations on behalf of their employer over their lunch hours. Thus, the Court finds that it was reasonable for the Petitioners to assume that the food which was served during the hotel evaluations was the “lunch” (which is by definition a “less formal” or “informal” meal) to which Mr. Nitcher had referred to in his e-mail as having been arranged by the Kansas Department of Education in advance.
The Court finds no evidence in the record to support an allegation that the Petitioners had any reason to question the arrangements which had been made in advance by the Kansas Department of Education regarding the hotel evaluations. In particular, there is no evidence in the record to support an allegation that the Petitioners had any reason to question the compensation arrangements which may have been made between the hotels and the Kansas Department of Education in advance of the evaluations. Since the e-mails clearly reflect that the Kansas Department of Education made all of the necessary arrangements for the meetings at the hotels, the Court finds that it was reasonable for the Petitioners to conclude that the State of Kansas was either providing the lunch and/or that the lunch was officially part of the evaluation process which they were instructed to attend. The reasonableness of this assumption is supported by the fact that the Kansas Department of Education ultimately ratified the Petitioners’ actions by paying for the lunches prior to the filing of the Complaints with the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission.
In fairness to the Petitioners and all employees of the State of Kansas, it would not be appropriate to examine their actions with the luxury of 20-20 hindsight. Rather, the actions of state employees accused of violating K.S.A. 46-237a must be viewed from their perspective at the time the alleged violation was committed in order to determine whether it was accidental or intentional in nature. In light of the e-mails sent to the Petitioners by their employer prior to the evaluations, they had no reason not to partake of the lunches when the food was served at the hotels. It is only with 20-20 hindsight, that the Petitioners actions are being questioned. Moreover, even after conducting his investigation, the Investigator was unable to present any evidence at the hearing to support an allegation that the Petitioners intentionally violated the provisions of K.S.A. 46-237a(c).
It is also important to recognize that pursuant to K.A.R. 19-7-4(g), the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission is bound by the stipulations which were entered on the record at the hearing held in this case. When the controlling facts are based upon stipulations of fact or documentary evidence, the Commission “has no peculiar opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Kneller v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 247 Kan. 399, Syl. 2, 799 P.2d 485 (1990). Under such circumstances, a reviewing court has an equal opportunity to examine and consider the evidence as did the Commission below. See Hudgens v. CNA Continental Cas. Co., 252 Kan. 478, 481, 845 P.2d 694 (1993).
At the Commission hearing, the parties specifically stipulated that none of the Petitioners “were aware that they were violating [K.S.A. 46-237a(c)] at the time they consumed the meals” and “that none of then were aware of who was paying for meal.” Certainly, the mere fact that the Petitioners ate the lunches which were served to them by the hotels during the evaluations does not constitute substantial evidence of a violation of K.S.A. 46-237a(c). Rather, the State of Kansas was required to present clear, certain and unambiguous evidence that the Petitioners purposely ate “free” lunches with knowledge that the lunches were being paid for by a source other than the State of Kansas. Based on a review of the record in its entirety, the Court finds that there is not substantial evidence of a clear, certain and unambiguous nature to establish that the Petitioners intentionally violated the provisions of K.S.A. 46-237a(c). Therefore, the Court concludes that the Respondent failed to meet its burden of proof at the hearing held in this case on May 23, 2005.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court concludes that the “Findings of Fact and Report” entered by the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission on June 3, 2005, should be and hereby is reversed as a matter of law.
This Memorandum Decision and Order shall serve as the Order of the Court. No further Journal Entry is required.
Entered on this day ______ day of October, 2005.
David E. Bruns
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the day of , 2005, she served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing pleading by United States mail, first class postage prepaid.
Pedro L. Irigonegaray
1535 SW 29th Street
Topeka, KS. 66611
Donna M. Voth
109 SW 9th Suite 504
Topeka, KS. 66612
Governor Kathleen Sebelius
212 S State Capitol
300 SW 10th Ave
Topeka, KS. 66612
Attorney General Phill Kline
2nd Fl. Memorial Hall
120 SW 10th Ave.
Topeka, KS. 66612
District Attorney Robert Hecht
200 SE 7th Street
Topeka, KS. 66603
Yolanda N. Anderson
Administrative Assistant